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We Can Make These Work: Revisiting Work Requirements in Medicaid Programs 







 Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day; teach a man to fish and he will eat for a lifetime.1  
That is how the old proverb goes, and there is a practical logic to that statement.  Education and 
opportunity for self-improvement may be able to sustain an individual for much longer than merely 
giving them what they need in that moment.2  Providing individuals the tools they need to be 
independent and thrive in a contemporary society where increased education and earnings correlate 
to better health outcomes for individuals makes sense.3  After all, if people are working and earning 
income, they more likely to have access to better resources, health services, and items like healthy 
foods, that inevitably improve the health of the entire person over time.4 
 Several states including Arkansas and New Hampshire attempted to accomplish through 
modifications to their Medicaid programs using “§ 1115 waivers” by putting people to work.5 To 
provide better health outcomes for the populace in their respective states, these states applied for 
the ability to experiment with the use of “community engagement requirements,” which are 
colloquially referred to as “work programs.”6  In these programs, specific individuals receiving 
state Medicaid benefits must participate in specified activities for a minimum amount of time to 
 
1 It is unclear who first said this phrase, but it is a common language idiom. 
2 See VCU CENTER ON SOCIETY AND HEALTH, Why Education Matters to Health: Exploring the Causes,  VA. 
COMMONWEALTH UNIV., (Feb. 13, 2015) https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/work/the-projects/why-education-matters-to-
health-exploring-the-causes.html. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 




keep those benefits active; should one not participate, the individual would see the benefits revoked 
during a “penalty period.”7  During this penalty period, the individual is prohibited from reapplying 
for Medicaid benefits.8 The ultimate goal of these programs is similar to the old proverb: teach a 
man to fish, and feed him for a lifetime—and keep him from using state benefits.9 
Litigation over the legitimacy of the Secretary’s approval under the Administrative 
Procedure Act ensued.10  After traversing through the D.C. Circuit, the case was pending before 
the Supreme Court.11  This case will not proceed as it currently stands.12 In February 2021, the 
Department of Justice submitted to the Court a letter explaining that the government no longer 
recognized the case as one fit for reviewing the issues on their merits because the new 
Administration desires for remand of the programs to the new Secretary.13 The letter related that 
under the new Administration the pending cases “no longer present a suitable context for [the] 
Court to review that decision on the merits.14 This change in Administrations does not mean a 
similar case will not rise to the forefront should more states seek to introduce similar programs. 
Moreover, work programs are an ongoing issue that will undoubtedly arrive in the form of a new 
waiver application in this administration or any following administration.15 While it is unclear that 






11 Philbrick v. Azar, 2020 WL 2621222 (D.C. Cir. 2020) , cert. granted, Azar v. Gresham, 2020 WL 7086046 (U.S. 
Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-37) consolidated with Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 
Arkansas v. Gresham, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38). 
12 Arkansas v, Gresham, (Nos. 20-37 and 20-38), https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/arkansas-v-gresham. 
13 Id/. 
14 Philbrick v. Azar, 2020 WL 2621222 (D.C. Cir. 2020) , cert. granted, Azar v. Gresham, 2020 WL 7086046 (U.S. 
Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-37) consolidated with Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 
Arkansas v. Gresham, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020) (No. 20-38). 
15 See THE FOUNDATION FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, FGA Files SCOTUS Brief Supporting Work 
Requirements, (Jan. 28, 2021), https://thefga.org/news/scotus-brief-arkansas/. Foundation for Government 
Accountability is joined by 18 different states in Amicus in support of Arkansas. This issue is one that remains 
divisive and hotly contested.  
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there are changes that could be made to each program to ensure they are aligned with both the 
primary and secondary objectives of Medicaid in future iterations. 
 This comment will examine the processes by which states may vary from statutory and 
regulatory Medicaid requirements using § 1115 waivers, to engage in experiments involving the 
use of work programs to further of interests in a manner consistent with the purposes of Medicaid. 
These processes will be explored through the lens of work programs such as that in Arkansas, and 
how such programs would fair under scrutiny by the current Court.  Part I of this comment explains 
the background of the Medicaid program and the process behind the creation of “§ 1115 waivers.” 
Part II examines the programs that faced opposition up to the Supreme Court in both Arkansas and 
New Hampshire. Part III examines the decisions made by the D.C. Circuit regarding these work 
requirements. Part IV analyzes the various ways in which the court could rule on the raised 
concerns, and which one the current court would likely follow. Part V reviews that placement of 
work requirements and how such programs need to be adapted in change to meet the standards 
required by statute and to survive judicial review, potentially through the creation of Totally 
Accountable Care Organizations. 
The intentions of the former Secretary and the States indicate various reasons for the 
introduction of these programs into the affected Medicaid plans.16 Questions still arose about the 
legality of these programs as they were “arbitrary and capricious” because the programs 
themselves in their designs were contrary to the purpose of the Medicaid statute as written, and 
the Secretary allegedly ignored that purpose.17 
Part I: Medicaid, Waivers and Purpose 
A. What is Medicaid? 
 
16 Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 97 (D.C. Cir 2020); see also Philbrick v. Azar, 397 F.Supp 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2019). 
17 Brief of Respondent at i, Azar v. Gresham, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2020) (No. 20-37). 
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 Before providing statutory analysis and an examination of judicial review when it comes 
to Medicaid program waivers, some background of how Medicaid works is of critical importance.  
By government definition, Medicaid is a program which “provides health coverage to millions of 
Americans, including eligible low-income adults, children, pregnant women, elderly adults, and 
people with disabilities.”18  The program is funded in combination by the states themselves and 
the federal government, but the program is primarily administered by the states.19  The program is 
authorized under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, simultaneously created in 1965 with the 
Medicare program.20  In 1964, President Johnson championed his vision of the purpose of 
Medicaid while Congress debated same in the chamber, “Our aim is not only to relive the 
symptoms of poverty, but to cure it and, above all, to prevent it.”21 
 The aim and goal of the original foundation of the original Medicaid statute may not have 
been so grandiose as President Johnson’s vision. In fact, the original Medicaid’s focus was on 
closing “one of the major gaps in the economic security of the elderly by providing protection 
against the high costs of hospital and medical care, and it brings the existing [old-age, survivors, 
and disability insurance (OASDI)] program more in line with current economic and social 
conditions.”22 This statement brings into focus two purposes. The first is an update to keep the 
existing programming current with economic and social needs.23 The second is to providing 
 
18 CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html#:~:text=Medicaid%20provides%20health%20coverage%20to, 
states%20and%20the%20federal%20government, (last visited Jan. 5, 2021), 
19 Id. 
20 CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, Program History, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/about-
us/program-history/index.html, (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) 
21 President Lydon Johnson, Lydon Baines Johnson First State of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964), available at 
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbj1964stateoftheunion.htm. 
22 Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1965: Summary and Legislative History 3. 
23 See e.g., John V. Jacobi, Medicaid, Managed Care, and the Mission for the Poor, 9 St. Louis J. of Health Law and 
Policy 187, 187 (arguing that many Medicaid beneficiaries rely on support for both medical care and other social 
services to which those needs could be coordinated and funded through Medicaid Accountable Care Organization 
and interagency cooperation). 
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protection against the high cost of hospital and medical care.24 This distinction is important to 
informing the present interpretation of the statue because this implies that the objectives of 
Medicaid go beyond just giving people insurance coverage. More than a simple number, the needs 
of the program may be seen as flexible to adapt and to change with economic and health 
emergencies of the time. 
 There are minimum requirements that all states must include in their Medicaid plans, 
including income and other eligibility factors.25 Standard coverage under Medicaid and prior to 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act, coverage included the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and 
families with dependent children.26   Congress expanded Medicaid as part of the Affordable Care 
Act in 2010 to include those low-income adults who did not qualify under the previous iterations.27 
After N.F.I.B. v. Sebelius,  the coverage expansion became optional at the election of each state.28 
Coverage will vary from state to state with some states, such as New Jersey having accepted 
expanded Medicaid permits single individuals and families to earn up to 138% of the federal 
poverty level.29  By contrast, some states did not expand Medicaid and have much more stringent 
requirements, such as Florida, who did not expand Medicaid and will not cover any non-disabled 
adult without children or other dependents.30   
The requirements of Medicaid include specific minimum coverages that must be provided 
to individual participants in the program.31  The program provides medical assistance to, or 
 
24 Id. 
25 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2018). It would be impossible to discuss all of the tenants of 
Medicaid here. This is a gross oversimplification of decades of development of a legal framework.  
26 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2018); Nat’l Fed’n Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012). 
28 Nat’l Fed’n Ind. Bus.,  567 U.S.  at 583. 
29 Jeanine Skowronski, A state-by-state guide to Medicaid: Do I qualify?, POLICYGENIUS, (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.policygenius.com/blog/a-state-by-state-guide-to-medicaid/ 
30 Id. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2018). 
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payment on behalf of, various classes of citizens who do not have their own health care coverage 
and meet one of several different possible criteria.32  There are clear guidelines as to what Medicaid 
must provide in terms of coverage, but what is less clear from this portion of statutory text is what 
the purpose of Medicaid is.33  The goal, according to President Johnson at the inception of the 
program, was the elimination of poverty.  This, however, may not be Medicaid’s current purpose. 
In fact, as shown by the legislative history, Medicaid’s objectives and purpose go far beyond 
handing a person an insurance card. 
B. What are Waivers and How Are They Born? 
The requirements of Medicaid are not immutable. An entire provision of the Social 
Security Act is devoted to “Demonstration Projects,” frequently referred to as § 1115 waivers.34  
This provision enables the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive compliance with the 
requirements of a portion of Medicaid for a State to institute “any experimental, pilot or 
demonstration project which…is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid 
program].”35 The intention is for these projects to be both temporary and budget neutral for the 
federal government.36 The process by which waivers are approved as been criticized for being a 
secretive or vague process.37 Moreover, waivers have also received criticism for reflecting the 
policies of the administration in power at that moment.38 
 
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (2018). 
33 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2018). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2018). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)-(a)(1) (2018). 
36 Sidney Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to Implement the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. OF HEALTH POLICY, LAWS & ETHICS 213, 214 (2015). 
Despite the temporal nature of these waivers, some have continued for decades without evaluation as to their 
efficiency or effectiveness. Id. at 215. 
37 Id. at 214-15. Watson specifically notes that “requests have typically been negotiated behind closed doors: 
demonstration goals were often not clearly states, the terms of the waivers were sometimes vague, and evaluations 
of demonstrations were often either done, or not shared with the public or [Health and Human Services].” Id. at 215  
38 See e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver after the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). 
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When Congress originally passed § 1115 and enabled the creation of waivers within the 
Medicaid and Social Security, the Secretary at the time, Wilbur Cohen, believed that is was a minor 
provision that would not carry a significant affect.39  The provision has proven beneficial to 
meeting the diverse needs of the states; as of 2017, thirty-three different states had forty-one 
approved § 1115 waivers.40   
Though there have been benefits since the introduction of § 1115 waivers, the Reagan 
administration used the waivers as a tool to change Social Security by using a combination of state 
and executive power, circumventing required congressional approval.41  Administrations after 
have used waivers or pushed for the use of waivers to circumvent Congressional approval to reach 
their goals.42  The executive use or encouragement of waivers does not necessarily have to be 
negative; the waivers have also been used for programs to address local health care emergencies, 
such as the rampant use of opioids in Colorado requiring the expansion of substance abuse 
treatment coverage or the targeting of potential underweight infants in Georgia.43 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) amended both and only Medicaid 
§ 1115 waivers.44 These amendments add a new section to the Social Security Act, 1115(d).45 The 
statute has specific requirements for the implementation of these waivers.46 First, there must be a 
 
39 David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The Case of Medicaid Eligibility Waivers, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 1590, 1596 (2018). 
40 Elizabeth Hinton et al., 3 Key Questions: Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
Feb. 2017, http://files.kff.org/attachment/ Issue-Brief-3-Key-Questions-Section-1115-Medicaid-Demonstration-
Waivers 
41 See Super, supra note 39, at 1596. 
42 See Super, supra note 39, at 1596-97. 
43 See HEALTHY MOTHERS, HEALTHY BABIES COALITION OF GEORGIA, Great News for Georgia’s Planning for 
Healthy Babies Waiver Program!, (Aug. 29, 2019), https://hmhbga.org/great-news-for-georgias-planning-for-
healthy-babies-waiver-program/ [hereinafter HMHBCG]; see also CO. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POL. & FINANCING, 
Ensuring a Fill Continuum of SUD Benefits, STATE OF CO., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/hcpf/ensuring-full-
continuum-sud-benefits, (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Colorado SUD]. 
 
44 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2018) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d) (2018)). 
45 Id. 
46 See 42 C.F.R. § 431.400 (2012). 
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specific notice and comment process for draft waivers that takes place at the state level.47 This 
process must include public hearings that are sufficient to “ensure a meaningful level of public 
input.”48 Bounds and limits exist for what this public hearing requirement may entail.49 Notably, 
these requirements cannot add onto those already required under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), nor can these pubic notice and comment requirements duplicate the requirements of the 
APA.50 These processes at the State level cannot be “unreasonable or unnecessarily burdensome” 
with respect to state compliance.51 
Draft waiver requests have specific requirements throughout the public notice and 
comment process. Requirements dictate the inclusion of five specific requirements to provide a 
“comprehensive description of the demonstration application or extension to be submitted to 
CMS” that contains enough detail to “ensure meaningful input from the public.”52 First, is a 
description of the program including the goals or objectives that will be implemented or extended 
during the project “including a description of the current or new beneficiaries who will be impacted 
by the demonstration.”53 Second, if there are any changes or alterations to the health care delivery 
system, eligibility requirements, coverage, or costs to beneficiaries, those must be detailed and 
compared to the state’s current plan.54 Third, the comprehensive description must include an 
“estimate of the expected increase or decrease in annual enrollment” and changes in 
expenditures.55 Fourth, a hypothesis related to the benefits of the project and the evaluation 
 
47 42 C.F.R. § 431.400(a)(1)(i) (2012).  
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 See 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i) (2012). 
53 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i)(A) (2014). 
54 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i)(B) (2014). 
55 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i)(C) (2014). 
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parameters of the demonstration.56 Finally, the state must also include “specific waiver and 
expenditure authorities that the State believes to be necessary to authorize the demonstration.”57 
States must meet several specific requirements for a satisfactory public notice process. The 
public notice and comment period must be at least 30-days before submission to CMS.58 Public 
notice must also include specific location and internet address so the public may view the 
application as well as physical and internet addresses where comments can be sent and reviewed 
by the public.59 The State must also publish the description of the process and links to the project 
on both the central CMS website and on the website of the relevant state agency.60 Hearings must 
be at a minimum of 20 days prior of submission of the application to CMS, and must have 
conducted at least two public hearings; one of these hearings must be telephonic or web-based 
unless in two opposing ends of the state.61 
Any final waiver application needs to document the public process utilized as well as the 
State’s responses to public comments.62 Following submission to the federal government, another 
thirty day comment period again where CMS must post the entire application and supporting 
documentation to its website and provide an email address to which public comments may be 
submitted.63 No decision can be made at the federal level on a waiver until at least 15 days 
following the end of the public comment period.64 The agency at the federal level does not need 
 
56 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i)(D) (2014). 
57 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(i)(E) (2014). 
58 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a) (2014). 
59 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2014) 
60 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a)(2) (2014). The procedures must also follow in accordance with the State’s Administrative 
Procedure Act. Id.  
61 42 C.F.R. § 431.408 (a)(3). There are also additional requirements for these public hearings, such as that they 
must use at least two different types of forums. Id.  
62 Watson, supra note 36, at 215. 
63 Watson, supra note 36, at 216. 
64 42 C.F.R. § 431.416 (2014). 
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to respond to either state or federal comments.65  
This updated process post-ACA has influenced the states to make modifications to the 
waivers they were submitting to CMS.66 Public input has substantially increased in some states as 
a result of these new procedures.67 Moreover, the expanded records have enabled more effective 
judicial review.68 
C. What is Medicaid’s Purpose? 
The Secretary has the authority under this statute to process in approving any § 1115 
waiver, but the problem lies in that these waivers must promote the objectives of Medicaid; there 
is confusion as to what “promoting the objectives” actually means.69  For example, in Stewart, a 
similar case to that involving the Arkansas Works program, the court concluded that the section 
that authorizes funds to be dispersed to Medicaid controls in the promotion of the objective.70 The 
court in that case held that that the objective of Medicaid was to “furnish…medical assistance” to 
those who cannot afford it.71 Chief Justice Roberts stated in N.F.I.B. v. Sibelius that the objectives 
of Medicaid had changed with the passing of the ACA.72 To be specific the Chief Justice iterated 
that Medicaid “is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of 
a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”73 This statement 
is in contradiction to the stated purpose of the Medicaid Act that has always been for “the purpose 
 
65 Id. 
66 Watson, supra note 36, at 217. This includes (1) Arkansas dropping three of its seix pending waiver requests in 
response to comments; (2) Iowa was forced to admit after public “call-out” that the goal of a proposed waiver was to 
reduce the number of beneficiaries and that the legislature had “made them do it;” (3) Arkansas faced scrutiny for 
not being “budget neutral;” and (4) Pennsylvania submitted a (now) grossly inadequate waiver. 
67 Watson, supra note 36, at 219. Pennsylvania’s original waiver application received more than 800 comments 
when the new public notice and comment requirements were introduced. 
68 See Watson, supra note 36, at 218. 
69 Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). 
71 Stewart I, 313 F.Supp. 3d at 260-61. 




of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish…medical 
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals 
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services.”74 
The purpose of Medicaid, however, may arguably be more than to provide medical 
coverage.75  Rather, in the words of former Administrator Seema Veera, the goal should be more 
than simply the provision of Medicaid as “[w]e have a moral responsibility to do more than just 
give [Medicaid beneficiaries] a card, we have a responsibility to give them care.”76  When 
Medicaid was greatly expanded under the Affordable Care Act, the program began to provide 
coverage for just the “most vulnerable citizens” and instead became a “vehicle to serve working-
age, able-bodied adults” by providing those individuals with healthcare coverage, which seems 
counterintuitive.77 
There are numerous examples of § 1115 waivers in use around the country to serve 
beneficial goals that go beyond simply handing one an insurance card.78  An example of the types 
of programs created using these waivers are Colorado’s Expanding the Substance Use Disorder 
Continuum of Care.79  Colorado’s program provides an expansion of medical assistance to the 
coverage of residential, inpatient, and withdrawal substance use disorder services.80  Another 
example of such a program, that was recently extended for an additional ten years, is Georgia’s 
 
74 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012). 
75 See Seema Verma, Administrator, Ctr. For Medicare & Medicaid Services, Remarks by Administrator Seem 





78 See e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, State Waivers List, MEDICAID.GOV 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/demonstration-and-waiver-list/81176, (last visited Jan. 5, 
2021) [hereinafter “Waiver List”; HMHBCG, supra note 43; Colorado SUD, supra note 43. 
79 Waiver List, supra note 78. 
80 Colorado SUD, supra note 43. 
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“Planning for Healthy Babies” program.81  This programs aims—and seemingly succeeds—to 
reduce the number of low and very low birthweight babies by providing no-cost family planning 
services to uninsured women whose families are at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.82  
Both of these programs are expansive in nature.  That is, these experiments offered by these two 
states offered services above and beyond what is required to be offered by the original provisions 
of Medicaid.  Both also appear to target specific needs of the population that receive this expanded 
coverage and benefits. 
Part II: Pushing for Work, Arkansas, and New Hampshire 
A. The Push for Community Engagement Waivers 
In 2018. President Donald J. Trump, Jr.’s administration issued guidance to the States 
suggesting that the Department of Human Services would approve waivers to the Medicaid 
program under § 1115 consistent with the Administration’s health care goals.83  This guidance 
suggested that the submission of waivers that would introduce work-requirements into the 
Medicaid frameworks would be approved.84  The guidance relied on Section 1901 of the Social 
Security Act.85  This provision states that the Social Security Act allows states to receive funding 
to provide “(1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of the aged, 
blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and 
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care[.]”86 
 
81 HMHBCG, supra note 43. 
82 HMHBCG, supra note 43. 
83 Letter From Brian Neale, Dir., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State 
Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7GP-HSUK]. 
84 See Super, supra note 39, at 1594-95. 
85 Neale, supra note 83. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2018). 
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The day after the issuance of this guidance, the State of Kentucky received approval for a 
proposal to impost a work-requirement on certain qualified individuals.87  These proposals came 
from eager states who wanted the flexibility to engage their working-age, able bodied citizens on 
Medicaid to be “actively engaged in their communicates, whether it be through working, 
volunteering, going to school, or obtaining job training.”88  Proposals and acceptance for eleven 
other states including Indiana, Arkansas, and New Hampshire, quickly followed.89  Not every state 
who applied received immediate approval.90  For example, Mississippi listed on its application for 
such a waiver that the goal was to reduce the costs associated with Medicaid.91  Mississippi’s 
application was rejected, and the State was told to resubmit its application without the language 
indicating that the purpose of the waiver was the reduction of costs.92  The resubmission of the 
application contained the exact same plan with the only alteration being the removal of the 
language related to the cutting of costs.93 
 The Trump Administration was not without its reliance on social science philosophy and 
data that other socioeconomic factors contribute to improved health outcomes for individuals. 
Medical coverage is not the only thing that determines health, though it is a contributing factor.94  
Health is correlated with wealth and financial independence, signaling that providing escape 
 
87 Super, supra note 39, at 1594-95. 
88 Seema Verma, supra note 75. 
89 See Super, supra note 39, at 1594-95. 
90 Colby Itkowitz, The Health 202: Mississippi Quietly Amends Its Medicaid Work Requirement Waiver, WASH. 
POST: POWERPOST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-
202/2018/08/09/the-health-202-mississippi-quietly-amends-its-medicaid-work-requirement-
waiver/5b6b0fdb1b326b0207955fca/?utm_term=.b0744b559a16 [https://perma.cc/TWN3-ZCA5 
91 Id. According to a speech made by Administrator Seema Verma at the National Association of Medicaid Directors 
(NAMD) 2017 Fall Conference, Medicaid spending has dramatically increase from 10% of state budgets in 1985 to 
29% of state spending in 2016. Seema Verma, supra note 26. 
92 Itkowitz, supra note 90. 
93 Itkowitz, supra note 90. 
94 See Neale, supra note 83. 
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mechanisms to poverty would be beneficial to the public as a whole.95  Improved education also 
provides increases to health outcomes including through the gaining of health knowledge and the 
instillment of healthy behaviors.96  Working also correlates with better overall well-being 
including better physical and mental health.97  Even volunteering can have a positive impact on a 
person’s health outcomes.98  From these anticipated benefits, Arkansas and New Hampshire both 
attempted to institute “work requirement” programs via § 1115 Waiver.99  The approval of these 
programs and the requirements of these programs spurred  litigation that was pending before the 
Supreme Court of the United States to answer as to the validity of the programs in light of the 
purpose of Medicaid and the authority of the Secretary to approve such programs.100  Before 
examining these consolidated cases in depth, an examination of the waivers that these two states 
applied for is required to understand the complete picture of what may be at stake. 
B. Arkansas Works (Or Will It?) 
 Like many other states following the Affordable Care Act, Arkansas took advantage the 
law to expand coverage to more individuals, albeit in its own way through a Section 1115 
waiver.101  Rather than directly providing coverage to individuals, Arkansas uses Medicaid funds 
to purchase health coverage by private providers for eligible recipients.102  Arkansas also had a 
previous job assistance program called Arkansas Works that encouraged individuals to voluntarily 
 
95 Mel Bartley & Ian Plewis, Accumulated labor market disadvantage and limiting long term illness. 31 INT. J. OF 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 336, 336-41 (May 2002) 
96 See generally Sarah Abraham, et al. The association between income and life expectancy in the United States, 
2001-2014, 315(16) JAMA. 750-1766 (Apr. 26, 2016). 
97 Gordon Waddell & A Kim Burton, Is Work Good For Your Health And Well-Being? DEP’T FOR WORK AND 
PENSIONS, (2006). 
98 Caroline Jenkinson, et al., Is volunteering a public health intervention? A systematic review and meta-analysis of 
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refer themselves to job assistance services offered by the state.103  This program would be changed 
with the acceptance and approval of the § 1115 waiver to adjust it to the new Arkansas Works 
program.104  This program introduced new requirements that any beneficiaries of the Medicaid 
program in Arkansas between the ages of 19 and 49 must work or engage in specified education, 
job training, or job search activities for at least 80 hours per month that must be documented.105  If 
one does not meet these requirements for three months, then that person is unenrolled from the 
Medicaid program and unable to re-enroll for one year.106 
 There are some exemptions that apply to this work requirements under this Section 1115 
Waiver, but also several other changes to the Medicaid program in Arkansas. Those who are 
exempted from the new work requirements are the medically frail, those who are pregnant, those 
caring for a dependent who is under the age of six, and students.107  The Section 1115 Waiver also 
removes guarantees of retroactive coverage under the Medicaid program.108  The program also 
reduces the income requirements for coverage from 133% of the federal poverty level back down 
to 100% of the federal poverty level.109 
 The Secretary approved most of the provisions of the Arkansas Works program.110 There 
were some minor changes made to the program before approval was granted.111  The term “work 
requirement” was notably changes to “community engagement.”112  The state was also not allowed 
to complete eliminate retroactive coverage from its original ninety-day requirement; instead, 
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retroactivity could only be limited to the previous thirty days.113  Arkansas was also not allowed 
to change the federal poverty level requirement from 133% to 100%.114  The program also includes 
a plan by the State, who had faced concerns regarding disruptions in service, to assist those facing 
unenrollment.115  Despite these concerns from the public, the Secretary insisted that Arkansas had 
a plan in place to resolve any issues and perform necessary outreach to prevent people from losing 
coverage.116  
 The Secretary concluded the program met numerous objectives of the Medicaid program 
and would promote those objectives.117  The objectives that the Secretary determined would be 
promoted by the granting of the waiver included (1) improvement of health outcomes; (2) the 
addressing of behavioral and social factors that influence health outcomes; and (3) incentivizing 
Medicaid beneficiaries to engage in their own health care and to achieve better health outcomes.118  
The promotion of these objectives match the socio-economic factors raised in the Trump 
administrations guidance issued a day before the approval.  These programs would have the 
benefits of encouraging beneficiaries to obtain and maintain employment or undertake other 
activities correlated to healthier outcomes.119  The shorter retroactivity period, for example, would 
also encourage individuals to maintain coverage because less gaps in coverage would be covered 
under the law.120 
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its initial introduction.121  For example, statistics indicated that approximately 18,000 people, or 
about 25% of those subject to the new rule and program lost coverage within just five months of 
the initiation of the program.122  Of these 18,000, 11% of those who had lost coverage regained it 
the following year.123  Of those who lost coverage through the program, there is no certainty as to 
why 89% of people did not reenroll as that data is not tracked.124  An additional 5% of all Arkansas 
Works enrollees lost coverage for reasons other than not meeting the reporting requirements under 
the program including moving out of state or failing to return requested and required 
information.125  As of February 2019, approximately 116,000 persons needed to complete the work 
and reporting requirements as the program would have been phased in and increased to almost 
239,000 enrollees.126  Of those required to report, 88% of enrollees did not report eighty hours of 
qualifying activities.127  These data points are inconclusive as to completely understanding the 
impact this program may have on coverage of individuals.128  
The collection of data is frozen in time as the Arkansas waiver has been set aside by the 
courts for not adequately analyzing the impact the program would have on Medicaid’s primary 
objective of providing health coverage.129  As such, questions surrounding enrollment cannot be 
answered as to the actual resulting effect. 
C. New Hampshire 
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 The factual circumstances surrounding the program in New Hampshire—called Granite 
Advantage—are memorialized in the District Court case that precedes the consolidation and 
granting of writ of certiorari with its companion case Gresham v. Azar.130  The program requires 
most adults who are not disabled and between the ages of 19 and 64 to participate 100 hours of 
employment or “other community activities.”131  The same categories that are exempt under the 
Arkansas program—those with a dependent child, the frail, and the pregnant—are exempt from 
these requirements.132  The rules of reporting are more strict than the Arkansas program as the 
person can only not report for two months instead of three.133  Unlike the Arkansas plan, eligibility 
resumes once the enrollee can demonstrate that they completed 100 hours of qualifying activities 
or obtaining an exemption.134  Like Arkansas, New Hampshire sought the elimination of all 
retroactive coverage.135 
 This waiver was approved by the former Secretary on November 30, 2019 citing the 
purported improvements to health and wellness of beneficiaries as well as the “fiscal sustainability 
of the Medicaid program.”136  The Secretary also stated that the requirements were not intended to 
produce coverage loss.137 
Part III: Journey to the Supreme Court 
A. Court of Appeals Analysis 
 The question is how the Court should decide the questions put forth by the various parties 
in their petition and response. The first question is “Whether the Secretary’s approval of Medicaid 
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demonstration projects in Arkansas and New Hampshire that impose work requirements and limit 
retroactive coverage was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, because the Secretary failed to consider how the projects would affect health coverage.”138 
The second is “Whether the court of appeals [sic.] erred in concluding that the Secretary may not 
authorize demonstration projects to test requirements that are designed to promote the provision 
of health-care coverage by means of facilitating the transition of Medicaid beneficiaries to 
commercial coverage and improving their health.”139 
 The questions are relatively the same but framed differently. The first relies on an 
examination of the proposed § 1115 waiver in light of the arbitrary and capricious standard under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.140 This is made clear by the phrasing “arbitrary and capricious” 
right in the question itself. The second question, by contrast, focuses on the power of the Secretary 
to authorize projects, but with a different vision of the Medicaid statute. This question invites the 
Court to appreciate the development and approval of these waivers by the Secretary via Chevron 
deference by showing that the statute is ambiguous in its purpose, and the agency’s interpretation 
would persist/ In the alternative, it suggests the purpose of the statute is simply the improvement 
of citizen health. 
 The Court of Appeals analysis moves away from Chevron deference and finds that 
Medicaid statute has a clear and unambiguous purpose.141 The court noted that other welfare 
statues like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families do have specific sections outlining a clear 
purpose.142 Unlike those statutes, the Court of Appeals found—through a little digging—the 
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unambiguous intent of the Medicaid statute within the section articulating the appropriations of 
funds.143 That provision states the purpose is to (1) furnish “medial assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources 
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other 
services to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-
care.”144 There is a consistent focus within the text on providing access to health care coverage.145 
 Other Circuits have used the appropriations provision to provide for the unambiguous 
purpose of the Medicaid statute as well.146 For example, in a case later affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the First Circuit stated that the purpose of Medicaid is for states to 
provide medical services to those whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the cost of 
required medical services.147 The Sixth Circuit ruled similarly in 2016.148 The Third Circuit has 
also stated that the primary purpose of Medicaid is the “praiseworthy social objective of granting 
health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”149 Even the Supreme Court has stated that 
Medicaid is a program that provides “medical care for individuals who cannot afford to pay their 
own medical costs.”150 
 This means that the Medicaid statute, to the Court of Appeals, satisfies the first prong of 
Chevron as this would be the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”151 The problem for 
the Arkansas Works program approval is that deference is then not afforded to the agency even 
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though the Secretary identified and demonstrated that there were secondary and tertiary objectives 
that would be satisfied via the approval of this waiver.152 These tangential goals, however, are not 
enough when the text of the statute specifically addresses the purpose of Medicaid to provide 
health care coverage.153 
 With the purpose defined, the Court of Appeals moved to apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard under the Administrative Procedure Act.154 The Court of Appeals when reviewing the 
record forward that the Secretary’s analysis regarding the loss of coverage, which was raised as a 
concern and resulted in same, it was not enough to “note the concerns of others and dismiss those 
concerns in a handful of conclusory sentences.”155 Upholding this decision would be the simplest 
way for the Court to resolve this issue and avoid any further conflict within this area. 
B. The Questions Before the Court 
 The question is, then, what the purpose of Medicaid actually is.  This question of purpose 
becomes one of the central issues of the pending Supreme Court case.156  The Opposition’s Brief 
highlights the question before the Court as, “Whether the Secretary’s approval of Medicaid 
demonstration projects in Arkansas and New Hampshire that impose work requirements and limit 
retroactive coverage was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, because the Secretary failed to consider how the projects would affect health coverage.”157  
This question gets directly to the heart of the matter as it focuses on the purpose of the Medicaid 
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statute.158  For example, if the purpose of the Medicaid Statute is to provide medical coverage to 
the needy, then the Secretary should consider the effect that any waiver may have on coverage and 
not approve any waiver that reduces coverage.159 
 This reading of the statute poses an interesting problem because any experimental program 
or demonstration project under § 1115 may then be required to expand health care coverage.160  
This means that any program may inherently have to be expansive rather than even potentially 
reductive.  For example, should New Jersey seek to create a program that would reduce the amount 
of coverage provided to individuals under the program in any way, then by default the Secretary 
would be unable to approve the waiver. An example is a program where a waiver would enable 
cuts of benefits to plan enrollees for the purpose of saving money with no research demonstrating 
the cuts would approve health outcomes.161 This would result because the only identified purpose 
of the Medicaid statute would be the provision of healthcare coverage.  By limiting the possibility 
for access or reducing services provided to enrollees, such would be in direct contradiction to the 
purpose of the statute. 
 In contrast, the question presented asserted by the States and the Department of Health and 
Human Services frames the issue somewhat differently.162  Most notably, the Secretary approves 
the programs that require individuals to “engage in work or skill-building activities (such as job-
skills training or general education) as a condition for continued eligibility of Medicaid benefits.163  
Therefore, the question becomes, “Whether the court of appeals [sic.] erred in concluding that the 
Secretary may not authorize demonstration projects to test requirements that are designed to 
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promote the provision of health-care coverage by means of facilitating the transition of Medicaid 
beneficiaries to commercial coverage and improving their health.”164  This is not a shift in the 
question, but rather a different framing of what the purpose of Medicaid is.  If the purpose of 
Medicaid is to improve the health and lives of the enrollees as is suggested here, then the Secretary 
has the authority to approve any program congruent with any of the various aims of Medicaid.  
These aims would include, as the Secretary posits, improving outcomes for enrollees.  This would 
be congruent with the statements made by CMS Administrator Seema Veera and the memo sent 
to states with supporting social scientific assertions that the facilitation a transition from a populace 
dependent on assistance to a self-providing populace better serves the aims of Medicaid as its 
purpose is to improve health outcomes. 
 The analysis in this circumstance appears that it would be far more complex than the 
purpose described by the respondents as the purpose of Medicaid is to provide medical coverage 
and nothing more.  The suggestion that the Secretary has a broader authority to determine merely 
that outcomes will, in effect, produce a healthier populace carries with it a higher standard for the 
Secretary to prove on the merits.  This higher difficulty is a result of providing evidence that such 
a program could demonstrably lead to these better health and social outcomes whereas the 
alternative is merely a question of expansion over potential regression.  
Ultimately, the way any of the parties frame these questions are inadequate.  The question 
should be a balance between the defined purpose of Medicaid and its discernable objectives.  That 
is, a program must be looked at as a complete whole rather than a mere numbers game.  In doing 
so, true experimentation becomes a possibility rather than a simple immediate numbered answer.  





and receive greater long-term benefits, that should be enough to tilt the balance in one way or the 
other—provided that those changes are supported by the reasons of improving health care and 
have some scientific or social science support.165 
C. What Does the APA Have to Do With It? 
 The other longstanding statute that provides how under the current precedential scheme the 
Supreme Court could possible rule is the Administrative Procedure Act.166  The question is usually 
one of two options: (1) has the agency properly interpreted an ambiguous statute, which would 
bring a challenge to the agency’s decision under Chevron deference or (2) if the agency has acted 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner under § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
The primary case in this area is Chevon U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984).  This standard governs the relationship between the legislature, the executive 
agency, and the role of the courts in regards to ambiguous statutes.  The Supreme Court held in 
Chevron that a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute must defer to 
the federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous statute.167  Chevron deference 
only applies in circumstances where the purpose of a statute is unclear.168  Therefore, an agency is 
bound by the purpose that Congress has set as well as the methods that Congress has deemed 
appropriate and proscribed for the pursuit of those purposes.169  The Administrative Procedure Act 
provides the standard of how a court may, and most likely will, review such a situation. To 
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reiterate, the only time that Chevron deference will come into play 
 Chevron is divided into a two-step analysis.170  First, the court asks “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”171  This first step may end the analysis and the court need not proceed 
further.172  For step two, if the court is able to find that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”173  The agency’s interpretation at a given moment in 
time does not have to be the final interpretation; everything is mutable.174  Any interpretation that 
the agency provides must be one that is reasonable.175 
 Chevron deference is not the only type of deference that may be afforded to an agency; 
there is also Skidmore deference.  Instead of the strict deferential standard set forth in Chevron, 
Skidmore deference considers the “totality of the circumstances” including all rulings, 
interpretations, and opinions of the administrator.176  Therefore, the amount of deference provided 
to the agency is based on the persuasiveness of the argument question.177  For example, under this 
standard, the Secretary would have to present underlying facts and historical circumstances the 
agency has looked at in the past. 
 The problem with either of these standards is that they only examine the Secretary’s 
authority to interpret under a statute; the only final determination is one of reasonableness. In that 
 
170 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. 
173 Id. at 843. 
174 Id. at 863-64. 
175 Id. 
176 See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
177 See generally id. 
26 
 
regard, this is too much deference.  Yet, these standards only apply in circumstances where the 
purpose or meaning of a statute is ambiguous.  In other situations, where the purpose of a statute 
is clear, the Secretary is not afforded such deference.  Where Congress is clear in a statute’s 
purpose then the Secretary or agency must follow that purpose.  There is no such ambiguity. 
 In the present circumstances of the Court, this precedential framework that has stood for 
years may be ripe for overturning.178  Justice Clearance Thomas leads this charge, relating in a 
scathing dissent during February 2020 that “Chevron is in serious tension with the Constitution, 
the APA, and over 100 years of judicial decisions.”179  The problem for Justice Thomas is that 
“Chevron compels judges to abdicate the judicial power without constitutional sanction.”180  
Chevron denies the courts their constitutional power and grants it to the executive agencies.181  At 
best, if not exercising judicial power, then the agencies are “unconstitutionally exercising 
‘legislative Powers’ vested in the Congress.”182  Chevron is a way to undermine the judiciary from 
exercising its checking power on the other branches of government.183 
 Beyond that, Justice Thomas is concerned that Chevron is even contrary to the 
Administrative Procedure Act from which it allegedly stems.184  The Administrative Procedure 
Act does provide that reviewing courts make the decisions surrounding questions of law, statutory 
provisions, and the meaning of terms of an agency action.185  In this section of the Administrative 
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Procedure Act, it is the responsibility of the Courts to be able to have the power to review agency 
decisions and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be…arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion…[or] unsupported by substantial evidence.”186 
 There are genuine and practical concerns, however, that overturning Chevron could lead 
to substantial practical consequences.187  Concerns include “activist judges” that could use judicial 
power to substitute their own policy preferences.188  This could also put a pause on all or most of 
agency action until Congressional alterations to resolve ambiguities in a statute occur.189  Agencies 
could become much less flexible in reacting to ongoing, new, and evolving situations in a way that 
Congress simply has not or cannot.190  Chevron itself recognized two important concepts for 
enabling the agency to have such expansive authority.  First, Congress either explicitly or 
implicitly delegated its own authority to interpret a statute and fill in any gaps.191  Additionally, 
the Chevron Court made it clear the executive agencies are better equipped than the courts to 
implement a technical and complex scheme.192 
 An alternative is arbitrary and capricious review under Section 706(2)(a) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.193  As mentioned earlier, this standard is to “reviewing court shall 
. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”194  In using this 
standard “the court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency 
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must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”195  However, not all agency 
change or action must be subject to more searching review, but they must “display awareness that 
it is changing position…it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the 
new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.”196  “It is enough when the new policy is 
permissible under the statute” and the agency believes the change to be better which is 
demonstrated by the “conscious change of course.”197  Justice Breyer, in dissent, would advocate 
that this standard requires the agency to explain why the agency now is making that change.198 
 The most confusing notion regarding Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act is 
when to apply which, partially because there appears to be some overlap between the two 
standards.  Chevron, for example, is supposed to be a way to intervene in agency interpretations 
of statutes.  The arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administrative Procedure Act revolves 
around the reasoning and evidence supporting agency decisions.199  These boundaries are often 
difficult to navigate, in terms of where the agency’s interpretation and the evidentiary review 
begins. Even the D.C. Circuit has remarked that, “Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious 
review overlap at the margins” which exemplifies the difficulty in determining which standard to 
apply or confusing the requirements of the two.200  The Supreme Court has even go so far to 
intermingle the two by suggesting that an inconsistent statutory interpretation would be able to 
trigger a reversal on arbitrary and capricious grounds.201  There are even cases where both 
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standards have been invoked at the same time.202 
This is an issue that persists because of the different “framings” of the purpose of the 
Medicaid statute, and such affects the approval of any § 1115, and § 1115 waivers in general, are 
reviewed going forward. It should also be briefly noted that the government did attempt to preclude 
the possibility of judicial review of § 1115 waivers altogether.203 The Court of Appeals quickly 
rejected this challenge as that limitation under the Administrative Procedure Act is very narrow 
and only applies where there is no law to apply—a situation that rarely arises.204 
Part IV: Possible Rulings 
A. Rulings that Do Not Eliminate Chevron 
Despite the conclusion of the purpose of Medicaid by the Court of Appeals, it is plausible 
that the ruling in that case regarding the purpose is incorrect. The aims of Medicaid go well beyond 
merely providing health care coverage. After all, reducing the use of experimental waivers in favor 
of playing a simple numbers game where the only question to be asked is “Does this expand or 
further provide additional coverage?” limits the use of these waivers in these programs. If the 
acknowledged secondary aims of the statute were balanced against the need to provide health care 
coverage, the quality of coverage may actually improve. 
 Another alternative is for the Court to rely on Chevron deference in the interpretation of 
the statute as ambiguous and offer deference to the agency to decide on what the outcome could 
be. As discussed above, there is a possibility that with the current make-up of the Supreme Court, 
with the addition of the three “Trump” justices that Chevron is not long for this world. This could 
be an instance where the Court uses this statute as a vehicle to provide an alternative method of 
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analysis. The Court does not have to in this circumstance; this may not be the case to do so. As a 
stretch, the Court could determine that the primary purpose of the Medicaid statute is  a mix 
between the provision of medical coverage and the improving the health of beneficiaries. Should 
the Court rely upon the much-maligned Chevron analysis, there is no question that the Secretary 
has the authority to determine which objective to meet provided that the reasoning put forth is 
reasonable, a standard which may be too lenient in curbing broad agency discretion. The work 
programs in Arkansas and New Hampshire would be able to continue to exist as currently 
incarnated. 
 The final alternative that may be the better solution is to use this case as an instance to 
recalibrate Chevron and recognize that the Medicaid statute is not a simple one size fits all purpose. 
After all, the waiver program exists to generate exceptions to the program to enable states to have 
the flexibility they need to meet the needs of their population. The better test then, may be to bridge 
Skidmore with the Court of Appeals original decision. Essentially, this would be a modified 
Chevron in circumstances where there is a primary purpose, but there are also several secondary 
and tertiary aims or objectives of a given statute. The legislature would not have provided these 
additional aims if there was no intention of them being met. Therefore, in situations where there 
are conflicting objectives, deference should be afforded to the Secretary but only insofar as the 
benefits of meeting the alternative aims and objectives are balanced against the original claims and 
objectives, which must be supported by data which provides clear and convincing evidence. For 
example, in the scenario of the Arkansas program, the potential socioeconomic benefits supported 
by data may outweigh the potential loss of coverage of those unable or unwilling to comply with 
requirements. In that scenario, deference should be afforded to the Secretary that has the 
knowledge in that area, as well as the state who understands their needs and the aims they intend 
31 
 
to meet supported by data. 
B. If Chevron Were Overturned 
 There are enough justices on the Supreme Court who it is believed would overrule Chevron 
and potentially replace it with something resembling more “traditional” judicial review as directed 
in the Administrative Procedure Act. As discussed, Justice Thomas is concerned that Chevron is 
even contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act from which it allegedly stems.205  The 
Administrative Procedure Act does provide that reviewing courts make the decisions surrounding 
questions of law, statutory provisions, and the meaning of terms of an agency action.206  In this 
section of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is the responsibility of the Courts to be able to have 
the power to review agency decisions and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be…arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion…[or] unsupported by 
substantial evidence.”207 
 The question would what the statute says, and not one of silence or ambiguity. For example, 
Chevron deference only applies in circumstances where a statute is unclear.208 If not deferring to 
an agency in these situations, the remaining tools for discerning the appropriateness of an agency’s 
action become set by (1) the guidelines of judicial review set forth in the Administrative Procedure 
Act; and (2) traditional notions of statutory interpretation including but not limited to textualism 
and purposivism. Although the Court has traditionally relied upon purposivism to yield to the 
“spirit” of a statute, textualism is the norm that now dominates the conservative majority on the 
Court.209 
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 To simplify a complex concepts such as textualism, there are specific tenants that inform 
this type of statutory interpretation. First, textualists note that after all of the legislative process 
and debate, what has survived is only the statutory text.210 Therefore, legislative intentions or 
purposes detailed throughout the legislative process cannot supplant or “alter the meaning of a 
duly enacted text.”211 Second, textualists urge judges to focus on how a reasonable user of the 
words would use the phrases uttered in a statute in context.212 There are limitations to how to define 
terms in a statute, however, so textualists must go to “unenacted sources of context” to flesh out 
the meaning of a statute including its relation to other statutes.213 By contrast, purposivists begin 
in the same spot—with the text.214 Despite this similarity, [e]ven when clear contextual evidence 
of semantic usage exists, priority is accorded to…contextual evidence of the policy considerations 
that apparently justified the statute.”215 
 The Court would have to read the Medicaid statute with fresh eyes. To reiterate, the 
Medicaid Act’s state purpose is to “enable[e] each State, as far as practicable under the conditions 
in such State, to furnish…medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of 
aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs 
of necessary medical services.”216  
Another alternative that is worth examining is the potential for a “Kavanaugh” approach which 
looks at judicial interpretation differently by being critical of the step which determines whether a 
statute is ambiguous or not.217 In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, judges should interpret statutes 
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according to the “clear text.”218 Currently, judges may use a variety of methods to resolve 
ambiguity including avoiding interpretations that raise constitutional questions, relying on 
legislative history, and deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute through 
Chevron deference.219 This does not resolve the question as to how judges determine whether a 
statute is ambiguous or not; Justice Kavanaugh relates that in his anecdotal experience, there is no 
rhyme or reason as to why judges decide one way or the other.220 This means that ambiguity is an 
ill defined concept with no clear interpretive norms.221 
 To resolve this problem, Justice Kavanaugh suggests moving the starting line. He insists, 
“[judges] should not be diverted by an arbitrary initial inquiry into whether the statute can be 
characterized as clear or ambiguous.”222 That initial step is skipped leading to an improved two-
step process. The first step requires that courts “determine the best reading of the text of the statute, 
by interpreting the words of the statute, taking into account the whole statute, and applying any 
other semantic canons of construction.”223 This “best reading” is based on how ordinary users of 
the English language would read and understand the language in question.224 Following that step, 
once judges have completed their “best reading” they can apply any of the other canons that offer 
a justifiable reason for the departure from the text.225 For Medicaid, this would result in embracing 
the primary objective of Medicaid in providing medical insurance to individuals, but also the 
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provision of social services programs.226 
The purpose as the D.C. Circuit as well as other Circuits have discussed when interpreting 
this statute is to provide health insurance coverage first and foremost. For example, The Frist 
Circuit stated that the Medicaid appropriations provision in drawing the conclusion that the 
purpose of Medicaid is for states to provide medical services to those whose income and resources 
are insufficient to meet the cost of required medical services.227 The Sixth Circuit ruled similarly 
in 2016.228 The Third Circuit has also stated that the primary purpose of Medicaid is the 
“praiseworthy social objective of granting health care coverage to those who cannot afford it.”229 
Even the Supreme Court has stated that Medicaid is a program that provides “medical care for 
individuals who cannot afford to pay their own medical costs.”230 Under a plain and textualist 
reading of the statute, these purposes make sense. This may mean, however, that any secondary 
and tertiary purpose or objective of Medicaid would not matter. The work programs in this case 
would fail because of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the programs in that they did not meet 
the one purpose they needed to: they needed to provide health coverage, not take it away. Thus, 
Arkansas Works and similar programs would fail in that context. 
The Court does not have to rely upon a simply textualist interpretation of the statute, but 
even under a purposivism framework, the Arkansas Works program would also certainly be 
required to fail. The Secretary would be arbitrary and capricious in his or her decision again. 
However, in this scenario there would be more objectives of Medicaid to analyze. For example, 
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the new version of post-ACA Medicaid is an experiment in 
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socialized medicine, something beyond the limitations of the previous version of Medicaid. 
Moreover, the Trump administration would point to a goal of improving health outcomes, 
supported by purveyors of the work program, as another objective of Medicaid. Taking all of this 
into account, to satisfy the requirements of being a satisfactory waiver, there must be two different 
things: (1) the provision of health insurance; and (2) better health outcomes for individuals. As 
presently incarnated, Arkansas Works would fail under this type of analysis. This does not mean, 
however, that there are no viable structures for work programs that could work. 
Part V: Making Work Programs Work 
The question is, then, do both of these purposes have to be met simultaneously for an 
acceptable waiver program? After all, if work programs were to improve health incomes because 
of the benefits of working, so what if a few persons are no longer able to participate in the program 
because they could not follow the rules? 
As a matter of public policy, the better of the two options requires both of these purposes 
be met. First, Medicaid must provide health insurance. Second, it must also provide better 
healthcare outcomes for individuals. Admittedly, there is a natural tension between these two aims. 
For example, the Colorado program related to assisting individuals with the opioid crisis. That 
program is directly targeted at a specific community need in improving health care outcomes for 
the individual by providing them access to effective substance abuse treatment. Counterintuitively, 
one could also say that the goal of a program like this is to help individuals get back on their feet, 
back into the workforce, and to no longer rely on Medicaid. In a round about way, the need in there 
is met in improving health outcomes, but once the health outcomes are improved that person may 
leave the Medicaid program as they begin to piece their life back together. This actually reduces 
the provision of health care coverage within the healthcare program. 
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Therefore, there can still be an effective work program solution that accomplishes the 
purposes of Medicaid while contending with one feature unique to the American system of health 
care: employer provided health insurance coverage. More than 175 million individuals within the 
United States are covered by employer coverage of some type.231 There does not seem to be any 
significant movement toward the United States moving toward a universal health care system in 
the near future.232 Therefore, there must be a way for states to shift from what Chief Justice Roberts 
referred to as universal healthcare to the preferred system of employer sponsored health insurance. 
Arkansas may have had the right idea and the proper concern; the philosophy may just have to 
shift from a model of penalty to a model of assistance. 
Before and even during the COVID-19 Pandemic, the United States faces a massive labor 
skilled labor shortage.233 This shortage has resulted in the possibility of reduced economic 
expansion in nearly every state.234 This shortage creates pressure for each state to recruit new 
individuals to move to it and to also bring back those individuals who have left the workforce.235 
In all, in 2019 thirty-nine states had more jobs than people looking for them.236 The situation is so 
poor in some states that some are offering financial incentives to entice people to move in or to 
“move back home.”237 In North Carolina, 50% of businesses reported having trouble finding 
qualified individuals to hire in 2019.238 One possible solution is to “mak[e] existing workers more 
productive by giving them new skills, and training new works drawn from disadvantaged groups 
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like prisoners and dropouts.239 
These groups include those who never reentered the workforce after the Great Recession.240 
For whatever reason, perhaps for lack of training or an aversion to skilled work, persons are 
avoiding these jobs, some of which quickly offer stable salaries at or above $90,000.00 per year.241 
With better and more stable employment, health care outcomes improve. High-earners who make 
more are generally happier and, more importantly for the purposes here, no longer require 
Medicaid as a service. 
The answer would be for Arkansas, and similarly situated states, to proverbially kill two 
birds with one stone by teaching people to fish so they can feed themselves for a lifetime. The key 
part of this is the education. Simply applying for work or volunteering does not necessarily 
improve skills necessary for the workforce in a meaningful way. Training, however, would. An 
effective version of Arkansas Works could operate much in the same way that the Colorado waiver 
program continues to deal with the opioid epidemic. Operate with the purpose of providing persons 
with health insurance while also offering connections to training or apprenticeships in these skilled 
professions. This will improve health care outcomes, while simultaneously, like the Colorado 
program, reducing the number of individuals reliant on Medicaid or other social programs and 
benefits. While finer details of such a program would be beyond the scope of this paper such as 
potential incentives for participation, no individual would be able to be cut from this program for 
not submitting timesheets. Instead, a program like this could move toward new progress and better 
outcomes for a wide-range of individuals from beneficiaries, their families, their future employers, 
and the tax payer who no longer pay for that persons health benefits and also have another person 
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contributing to the tax pool in a more meaningful way. Such a program would meet the two 
purposes of Medicaid in improving health outcomes and providing insurance coverage. There 
would be no problem with meeting the bounds of approval of such a program or the Secretary 
allowing the experimental nature of it. Frame it as education leading to better health outcomes, not 
handing in a book report every week to show you have applied to multiple jobs under the threat of 
taking away one’s medical coverage. 
One type of program that has been emerging in recent years is the “Totally Accountable 
Care Organization” that would push accountability in a new direction.242 These organizations are 
where Medicaid can meet every objective and check every box necessary for its primary purpose 
and secondary objectives. These organizations, which are funded through Medicaid programs, 
would be responsible for services in addition to simple medical care including social supports like 
employment training, mental health, and substance abuse treatment.243 Such a system reduces costs 
by targeting the most disadvantaged in our society, those who are facing crisis beyond having 
medical coverage including chronic unemployment.244  
These individuals are lacking in health equity wherein the individuals are prevented from 
reaching their full potential because of their social position or other socially determined 
circumstance including having gainful employment, education, and earning capacity.245 More and 
more research suggests that addressing these additional factors that target these social behaviors 
or deterrents is more effective at improving health overall than handing an individual a Medicaid 
card and sending them on their way.246 
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The best way for Arkansas and other states who wish to institute work requirements into 
their program is to do so through an experimental Totally Accountable Care Organization. These 
organizations “go beyond medical care, and sweep in such social services as housing, substance 
use disorder treatment, and reentry programming for ex-offenders.”247 No reason exists as to why 
such organizations could not further integrate job training, apprenticeships, and similar 
programming as part of their social services and mission to improve the health of the poor. The 
goal is to break the cycle. These states have the ability to stave off their possible of multitudes of 
crisis with a single experiment: skilled labor shortages, reduction of health care costs, and 
improvement of health outcomes for their populace. These states should adjust their mindset. 
While eliminating people from the Medicaid program may benefit the “bottom-line” in the short 
term, the only thing it does is exasperate costs in the long term. Those who are the sickest, and 
cannot access health care through other means, are the biggest users of Medicaid and Medicare in 
general.248 The way to reduce costs long term is to break the cycle, provide people with what they 
need, and have them provide for themselves for their lives. As the old proverb could be modernized 
to, “Hand a man a Medicaid card and he will have medical care, but if you teach a man to be a 
plumber, then he can have a happy, successful life with employer paid insurance.” 
Conclusion 
 Section 1115 waivers for “work programs” that accomplish what states intend to do and 
meet the requirements of the purposes of Medicaid are a possibility. While the current iterations 
of work programs may make a return and appear before the Court, the legal circumstances 
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surrounding how the Court would presently interpret the Medicaid statute are murky at best. The 
Court may eliminate Chevron deference, or the Court could determine that the statute is ambiguous 
altogether. The Court could even take a new and unique approach, such as that suggested by Justice 
Kavanaugh, to avoid the seemingly subjective question of ambiguity entirely. 
 Whatever the Court decides, the states must take a different approach when generating 
work programs or—as seemingly as the new catchphrase—community engagement waivers. By 
creating a program that meets the purposes of Medicaid as well as its secondary and tertiary 
objectives, the states may be able to avoid the judicial review problem altogether, leaving the Court 
out of the issue. A possible solution to this problem would be the Totally Accountable Care 
Organization that shifts Medicaid from the simple provision of medical coverage to a provider of 
health and social services. By providing training to the population as a whole through these 
services, the states can solve a number of social problems including work shortages, but most 
importantly, teach people to fish for a lifetime. 
 
